Published in 2025
Executive Summary
Before 2011, the Tunisian legal corpus generally had no whistleblower reporting or protection mechanisms. Following the 2011 revolution, the state made a wave of advancements in the fight against corruption, enacting Organic Law No. 2017-10, which adopted concrete measures to provide physical, moral, and legal protection to whistleblowers. Additionally, the state intensified and diversified the bodies responsible for combating corruption, establishing the National Authority for the Fight against Corruption (INLUCC) in 2011.
Although there seemed to be strong political will, efforts made by the Tunisian authorities, including the establishment of the INLUCC, did not eliminate deficiencies related to whistleblower reporting mechanisms and protection. Moreover, since 2021, the government has frozen INLUCC operations, jeopardising and hindering the fight against corruption in Tunisia, even though article 130 of the 2014 Constitution established it as an independent constitutional body.
The 2022 Tunisian Constitution amended article 130 of the 2014 Constitution and removed references to this authority, thus rendering the INLUCC vulnerable to interference from the executive and judicial bodies. However, the remaining legal frameworks continue to support the institutional mission of combating corruption, particularly Organic Law No. 2017-10 on whistleblower protection and corruption reporting.
Introduction
The past two decades of Tunisian contemporary history have been unstable for both institutional and governmental frameworks, despite the country’s promising post-revolutionary legal advancements.
During Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s 23-year reign, his family was said to have had stakes in major Tunisian banks, airlines, car dealerships, Internet providers and even radio and television stations. Tunisia’s first lady, Leila Trabelsi, came to be known as the most palpable manifestation of the state’s pre-2011 corruption, allegedly extorting money alongside her 10 siblings and demanding stakes in both large and small enterprises. Leading up to the 2011 ousting of Ben Ali following mass protests, outlets reported that his family had fled the country with 1.5 tonnes of gold, supposedly originating from the Tunisian Central Bank.
After the 2011 mass mobilisation, a promising democratic transitional phase took hold, with the creation of the “Political Reform Committee,” eventually renamed “the Higher Commission for the Achievement of the Objective of the Revolution, of Political Reform and the Transition to Democracy.” Shortly after, however, the nascent democracy suffered from incessant economic crises, or as some experts put it, “living beyond its means.” Popular grievances with continued social, economic and political exclusion – particularly following a 2015 proposed bill that would have granted amnesty to former regime officials guilty of corruption – led hundreds of Tunisians to take to the streets under the movement later known as “Manish Msamah” (I will not Forgive).
On the back of this economic crisis and political disillusionment, Kais Saied, a retired law professor, came to power in 2019. However, promises of political change were abandoned when, in 2021, in what became known as the “July 25 process,” Saied activated Article 80 of the 2014 constitution and dissolved the parliament, dismissed the government, and called for the drafting of a new constitution. Described as a “corrective process,” Saied consolidated state powers and allowed himself to rule by decree. Since then, the freedom of the press has narrowed, with countless journalists, media personalities, and opposition figures landing in the country’s burgeoning prisons. Tunisia fell 11 places in the 2025 RSF World Press Freedom Index, ranking 129th out of 180 countries.
Seen once as the beacon of hope for democratic change within the MENA region, and despite very promising post-2011 reforms to the legal corpus to include progressive and protective legislation, application of new whistleblower protections seems to have been stunted since Saied’s power grab in 2021. Contrary to initial appraisals of his judicial career, he massively undermined the independent Tunisian judiciary. In 2022, 57 judges were dismissed, following a presidential decree that provided the powers to interfere with and fire judges. Earlier this year, Human Rights Watch released an in-depth report highlighting the repressive and arbitrary detention means used by Tunisian officials to “crush dissent.” Coupled with a severe economic crisis and growing debt, Tunisia has slowly drifted away from its initial path of democratic change and regressed to levels of corruption unseen even in pre-revolutionary times.
Analysis of the Legal Framework:
Even though the Tunisian government ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in September 2008 and the Arab Convention Against Corruption in 2016, the country’s legal framework still does not fully comply with the articles of the Convention.
While the 2014 constitution does not strictly mention any protection methods for those wishing to reveal corruption in their institutional or professional environment,
Laws and measures related to whistleblowers
As a precursor to the Organic Law 2017-10 and one of the first pieces of legislation mentioning whistleblowers, article 11 of the Framework Decree guarantees that the state will “fight corruption…by spreading…social awareness of its danger…and by establishing measures to protect victims, witnesses and whistle-blowers” [translated from Arabic]. Although the article omitted the legal mechanisms required to implement the law, it paved the way for legislative discussions regarding whistleblower protections and culminated in the 2017 Organic Law.
Equally a precursor to subsequent legislation protecting whistleblowers, Organic Law No.2013 highlights the importance of providing protections to those wishing to ‘reveal the truth’, a term alluding to the revelation of corrupt practices, particularly in the context of post-revolutionary Tunisia. While the direct terminology of “whistleblower” or “reporting against corruption” had not yet been employed at the time, the law nonetheless provides a strong groundwork of protection for those seeking to unveil truths surrounding pre-2011 corrupt practices. Article 2 of the law guarantees that, “The revelation of the truth concerning violations is a right guaranteed by law for all citizens, taking into account the interests and dignity of the victims and without undermining the protection of personal data” [translated from French]. Article 11 equally puts in place the right to reparations “for the harm suffered by victims of violations” [translated from French].
As one of the first post-revolutionary texts calling for anti-corruption measures within public bodies, the circular mandates a “governance unit” within each ministry, governorate, and public institution or enterprise, which would be the sole liaison with the office of the Prime Minister in charge of combating corruption in those departments. The unit is equally tasked with informing the Minister of all corruption cases, their outcomes, and the procedures taken or planned regarding the cases. Lastly, the circular enables citizens, under applicable legislation, to access all information, data, decisions, expenditures, programs, and annual reports related to the new institution.
Passed in December 2019, Decree No. 2019-1123 provides mechanisms for the public and private sector to combat corruption, although it does not necessarily outline direct incentives for individuals to report corruption. Instead, the decree sets financial incentives for institutions to adopt anti-corruption measures. In its article 2, such incentives are developed more in detail, namely the fact that they are “granted based on the fulfillment of the following conditions and practices:
- The establishment of a governance unit and the approval of its action plan
- Fulfillment of obligations related to the right of access to information
- Implementation of appropriate mechanisms to ensure compliance with the code of conduct and ethics for public officials
- Implementation of approved training programs on good governance and the fight against corruption.”
As for the private sector, article 2 specifies the necessity of developing codes of conduct that strengthen performance, transparency, and the integrity of transactions. This is suggested through “the development and implementation of training programs on governance and the fight against corruption and cooperation with law enforcement agencies and public authorities for the investigation of suspected corruption cases.”
Definition of a whistleblower according to the law:
In 2017, Tunisia introduced Organic Law 2017-10 on the disclosure of corruption acts and whistleblowers protection. Article 2 of the law defines a whistleblower as “any natural or legal person who is reporting, in good faith, to the competent authorities information constituting serious presumptions or gives reasonable grounds to suspect the existence of acts of corruption, with the aim of identifying its perpetrators, and in accordance with the conditions and procedures provided for by this law.”
As for the mechanisms of protection, article 2 defines them as “all procedures aimed at protecting the whistleblower, whether a natural or legal person, against various retaliatory or discriminatory measures they may face as a result of reporting an alert.” Retaliation is considered in all its forms, whether through “continuous harassment, disguised sanctions, or more generally any abusive action taken against them, including disciplinary measures such as dismissal, termination, denial of promotion, refusal of a transfer request, or abusive transfer. It also includes threats or physical or psychological aggression against the whistleblower or any person closely associated with them,” as later defined more specifically in article 26.
Reporting mechanism:
The whistleblower must report corruption disclosures to the National Authority for the Fight Against Corruption (INLUCC) either in person or through registered mail, and the authority must respond with a mandatory receipt. INLUCC’s primary mission includes reviewing protection mechanisms and requests, as well as the duration of protection granted to the whistleblower. The decision must be reached within three days of receipt, and the whistleblower must be notified within 48 hours of the issuance of the decision. Within ten days of notification, any decision may be appealed before the urgent matters judge of the Administrative Court, who must issue a decision within seven days of the appeal.
The law mandates that the contents of the disclosure must include “the surname, first name, address[,] and identity card number of the whistleblower, … [or] the company name and registered office, if the whistleblower is a legal entity, … the facts that are the subject of the report, … [and] the identity of the person or organisation that is the subject of the report” [translated from French]. The INLUCC can initiate investigations, handle complaints, and report findings to the appropriate judicial or administrative bodies. The authority retains its role in addressing corruption across both public and private sectors, by its founding legislation, even if no longer constitutionally mandated.
Protective measures:
The whistleblower has access to protection from retaliation, either upon their request or that of the INLUCC. Article 19 establishes specific mechanisms for notifying and dealing with allegations within defined timeframes while ensuring that whistleblowers are protected “against any form of retaliation, discrimination, intimidation or repression. They shall also be protected against any criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, as well as against any other measure causing them material or moral harm.” This protection is enforced in coordination with the relevant public and security authorities, in accordance with the applicable legislation; it is equally extended to persons closely associated with the whistleblower who could also be subject to retaliation, as defined under article 26. Article 23 of the law equally provides protections against criminal or disciplinary sanctions to which whistleblowers are often subjected for breaching confidentiality clauses. As for the burden of proof, under Article 20, the responsibility does not fall on the whistleblower; instead, according to Article 21, the whistleblower is simply required to report the facts of the alert to the Authority for Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption, which, under its discretion, decides whether the alert merits protection.
Additionally, Article 24 of the law provides for judicial and legal assistance for the whistleblower from an administrative court without necessarily requiring them to meet the criteria needed to benefit from legal assistance, such as the minimum penalties incurred. Not only is disclosing the whistleblower’s identity punishable by penal sanctions, but there are equally financial indemnities for damages inflicted on the whistleblower.
However, it must be noted that currently, the INLUCC’s activities are nonexistent, due in part to the government’s pushback against independent anti-corruption institutions.
In 2019, a government decree outlined the compensation of whistleblowers. In Article 6, the compensation is estimated at five per cent of the value of the funds recovered as a result of the disclosure of the corruption offences; the reward, however, cannot exceed fifty thousand dinars (around fifteen thousand euros).
However, for the whistleblower protection NGO I WATCH, the absence of specific decrees outlining police assistance in protecting whistleblowers is a weakness in the legislation, as well as the relatively narrow definitions of disclosures, which thus exclude more generally broad behaviour that is dangerous to the public interest.
Laws and measures related to combating financial crime
Passed in 2019, this law amends and supplements Organic Law No. 2015-26 on the fight against terrorism and suppression of money laundering. References to whistleblowing can be found in Article 107, which requires reporting entities to report suspicious transactions and outlines the duty of due diligence. Should financial corruption be found in an institution, Article 140 bis provides for sanctions, including potential dissolution of legal entities involved in financial crime, which implies the importance of internal controls and whistleblowing. Article 120 provides that the Tunisian Commission for Financial Analysis (CTAF) will receive and analyze alerts identifying suspicious transactions.
Considered a key legislative text in the fight for transparency and against conflicts of interests within the public sector, Law No.2018-46 cancels Decree No. 17 of 1987 on the declaration of the earnings of members of the government and some types of public agents. Instead, it proposes a more holistic mandate, obliging public officials to declare assets and interests, which must encompass those of their spouses and minor children, within the first 60 days in office, every three years thereafter and upon leaving the position. INLUCC is mandated to investigate and verify suspicions of illicit enrichment, as per Article 38, and to eventually receive and manage these declarations, before forwarding the case to the competent judicial authorities. Should a public official possess resources from illegal enrichment, they could be subject to imprisonment for up to six years, fines equivalent to the value of the illicitly acquired assets, confiscation of assets deemed to be illicitly obtained and disqualification from holding public office or running for election for ten years, as per Article 37 of the law.
According to Sections 1 and 2 of the Decree, public officials are tasked with immediately informing their superiors in cases of conflicts of interest, as well as declaring in writing to their hierarchical superior any private interests that may conflict with the obligations entrusted to them. As for their assets, the public official is required to declare under oath their movable and immovable assets, as well as those of their spouse and minor children. The update or renewal of the declaration must be carried out regularly, following the period prescribed by law or regulation. The public official is also required to submit a declaration upon leaving office.
Article 29 of the code obliges “all the authorities and public servants to inform the Public Prosecutor about the crimes they learn about while performing their official duties.” It also obliges them to hand over all the notes and documents concerning said crimes. However, the article has not stated a punishment for not reporting crimes.
Media Rights and Freedom of Expression
Since his re-election on October 6, 2021, in which he amassed 90.69% of the votes, Kais Saied’s second term has been shrouded by attacks on the freedom of expression and a move by journalists towards self-censorship to avoid persecution and imprisonment. On August 1, 2024, the National Union for Tunisian Journalists (SNJT) condemned the governmental body, the Independent High Authority for the Elections (ISIE), for sending warnings to four private radio stations accusing them of “not respecting the rules for transparency and objectivity in covering the electoral process” It is not the first time that the ISIE has been accused of silencing opposition voices, misusing the law and persecuting activists, namely through the Decree-Law 2022-54 on fighting cybercrime, described by Tunisian journalist Hene Zbiss as the “sword of Damocles” for its repressive utilisation.
Passed in September 2022, much of this law’s usage has been to sue and imprison political figures, civil society activists and journalists under its article 24 charges of “disseminating fake news on communications networks,” which could lead to a five-year or ten-year prison sentence, the latter reserved for public officials.
Less than two months into the decree’s implementation, the editor of the online news outlet Business News, Nizar Bahloul, was sentenced to 4 months in jail for spreading “fake news” and “defaming” a state official, following an opinion piece published on his website that criticised Prime Minister Najla Bouden. Similarly, lawyer Mehdi Zagrouba had a criminal investigation opened against him for accusing Justice Minister Leila Jaffel of “fabricating” court files and opening “bogus court investigations” for judges dismissed by Saied.
The law goes further by sanctioning the surveillance of people’s internet use and the collection of their personal telecommunications data from service providers on the grounds of “revealing the truth,” according to Articles 9 and 10. According to Amnesty International, the cybercrime decree law “grants authorities sweeping powers to monitor how people use the internet, collect personal data, and intercept private communications based on vaguely defined criteria.”
Dating back to the Ben Ali era, the 2001 Code of Telecommunications has been criticised for being used as a tool to silence journalists and activists from denouncing state violence. Article 86 of the Code was famously used against multiple Tunisian activists, such as Myriam Bribi, who was charged in 2021 after she had posted a video on Facebook calling out police who were violently arresting a man. The article condemns anyone who ‘knowingly harms third parties or disturbs their peace through public telecommunications networks is punishable by imprisonment of one to two years and a fine of one hundred to one thousand dinars’ (of around thirty to three hundred euros).
Equally used against bloggers, activists and journalists, Article 128 of the Tunisian Code provides a golden opportunity for officials to imprison “anyone who, through public speeches, the press, or any other means of publicity, attributes illegal acts related to their duties to a public official or an equivalent, without establishing their truthfulness, is punishable by two years of imprisonment and a fine of one hundred and twenty dinars” (around thirty-five euros). Since determining the truthfulness of journalistic work and citizens’ grievances remains up to the discretion of prosecutors, the code has been actively used to charge bloggers such as Amina Mansour and Aymen Ben Selma, according to the secretary-general of “Bloggers Without Chains,” Mohamed Ali Bouchiba. Similarly, Article 125 of the code punishes anyone “insulting a public officer during the performance of his duties,” with up to one year imprisonment. As for article 67, which dates to 1956, the code punishes those found “guilty of insulting the head of state” with up to three years imprisonment.
Access to Information Laws
Article 38 of Tunisia’s 2022 constitution ensures Tunisian citizens’ rights to information, enshrining that “the State guarantees the right to information and the right of access to information and communication networks.” The key legislative tool regulating access is Law 22-2016 on the Right to Access Information, passed in 2016.
In its article 3, the law describes information as “any recorded information, regardless of its date, form or medium, produced or obtained by the bodies subject to the provisions of this law in the course of carrying out their activities.” As for the act of accessing information, it is described as “the proactive publication of information by the concerned body and the right to access it upon request.” As for the obligations of public institutions, article 6 defines them as the requirement “to publish, update, and periodically make available to the public, in a usable format, the following information:
- The policies and programs that concern the public
- A detailed list of services provided to the public, the certificates issued to citizens, and the required documents for obtaining them, as well as the conditions, timeframes, procedures, parties involved, and steps for delivering these services.”
The scope of the law is vast, applying to government ministries and public institutions, state-owned enterprises, local authorities, and independent constitutional bodies and any private entity managing public funds or providing public services. As for its overseeing body, the Access for Information Authority (INAI) ensures the exercise of this constitutional right and establishes the objectives of the law
Whistleblower Cases
Tunisia has had a plethora of cases of whistleblowers following its 2011 revolution, who have chosen to speak out against financial or moral corruption. Below is a non-exhaustive list documenting the heroism of these individuals.
- Samir Feriani, a senior Interior Ministry employee, was arrested in May 2011 after accusing several senior officials of destroying evidence of their human rights abuses during the 2011 Tunisian Revolution. Following his arrest, multiple civil society organisations rallied for his freedom, including a Human Rights Watch condemnation. He was acquitted of major charges in March 2019.
- On March 31st, 2014, Anis Azizi shared information on his Facebook page, exposing the corrupt practices within his workplace at the Tunisian Real Estate Property Administration. Two weeks later, he was stabbed to death in front of his house, with the perpetrator sentenced to death in 2016. Despite this, no investigation was opened into Mr. Azizi’s whistleblowing claims and disclosures.
- Sami Ben Alaya, an employee of Tunisia’s Grain Office, which oversees the regulation, importation, storage, and distribution of grains, unveiled major corruption within the agency. In February 2025, he was found dead in his apartment, allegedly by suicide, raising questions among other activists[1] of potential retaliation from the agency.
- Mohamed Ali Al-Ayari, an employee of the state-owned steel company in Menzel Bourguiba, brought forth allegations of corrupt practices within the enterprise. He now faces more than 16 legal cases against him and has called on the President to reactivate INLUCC, dissolved in 2022.
- Hela Bachtobii, Achraf Ben Aicha, Hana Ayed, Daoud Khadhraoui, Haitham Beltaief, and Hatem Ressissi had allraised suspicions of embezzlement and corruption and reported them to the relevant authorities in their respective institutions: the Tunisian Federation of Aeronautical Sports and Associated Activities, the National Railway Company of Tunisia (SNCFT), the Petroleum Research and Exploitation Company in Tunisia (Serept), the National Cellulose and Alfa Paper Company (SNCPA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Court of Auditors. Faced with either refusal or hostility, most of their efforts came to no avail.
Recommendations: Weaknesses and Needed Reforms
While Tunisia has taken important steps toward protecting whistleblowers, most notably through the 2017 Organic Law and other legal provisions, these measures are not sufficient. Notably, anonymity clauses, disclosure to third parties, and internal channels for whistleblowing within institutions are absent. More comprehensive clauses within the current whistleblower protection law are urgently needed to clearly define protection mechanisms not only for whistleblowers but also for their families.
- INLUCC is a key body in the protection of whistleblowers and must be restored to its previous functions and granted back its former constitutional status.
- The government must address the lack of public awareness about the importance of whistleblowing and remedy the culture of secrecy and fear of disclosures. Despite official statements asserting a commitment to fighting corruption and safeguarding whistleblowers, the government has made little effort to actively encourage citizens to come forward and expose wrongdoing.
Knowledge, Support and Action Centres
As of 2025, the situation in Tunisia is extremely dire: the government regularly targets and imprisons civil society members for speaking out against detrimental governmental decisions. Civil society has experienced the brunt of drastic changes since 2021 and many organizations have reduced or self-censored their activities. For example, the civil society organisations and media outlets below work either to directly aid whistleblowers or shed light on corrupt practices.
- I WATCH
Through its platform www.billkamcha.tn and the annual Whistle-blower of the Year Award, I WATCH promotes transparency and the protection of whistleblowers in Tunisia. Those few citizens who do choose to come forward often turning to civil society organisations like I WATCH for support due to the perceived lack of political will from government institutions. I WATCH launched the Whistle-blower of the Year Award in 2012 to honour whistleblowers and promote awareness about the importance of whistleblowing in Tunisia. The winner is chosen through a public vote.
- InkyFada
Founded in 2014, InkyFada is an independent media outlet that has worked to shed light on socio-economic matters and concerns within the Tunisian context. The outlet has received multiple awards, particularly for its journalists’ investigative work regarding the complicity of Tunisian officials in the Panama and Swiss Leaks.
- Kashf Media
An independent interactive media outlet, Kashf Media produces in-depth investigations, reports, profiles, analytical articles, and firsthand testimonies to enrich the media landscape with distinguished and comprehensive content. In February 2025, the outlet published a video interview with whistleblower Mohamed Ali Al-Ayari, who denounced state actions towards whistleblowers.
[1] In a statement to Kashf Media, Al-Ayari suggested that Ben Alaya may have been assassinated rather than having committed suicide, especially since he had repeatedly stated that he had received death threats. He emphasized that Ben Alaya will not be the last to be eliminated for exposing corruption cases, adding that “this will not deter us from continuing down this path, and we will not retreat from the fight against corruption”.
