Senegal

Published in October 2026

Introduction and Context

As of September 2026, Senegal is the latest country in Africa to have adopted standalone whistleblower protection legislation, law n°2025-14, and becomes, as a consequence, one of only twelve African countries to have done so.¹ This represents a genuine milestone that significantly strengthens the fight against corruption in the country, a fight in which PPLAAF has played a leading role since 2020.

Over the past several years, PPLAAF has implemented a series of awareness-raising initiatives, including capacity-building workshops, training sessions, and public conferences for journalists, activists, trade unionists, civil society members, citizen movements, and parliamentarians. These efforts have helped foster a shared understanding of whistleblowing as a public-interest mechanism and highlight the need for a strong legal framework. This sustained work has significantly contributed both to strengthening key stakeholders’ understanding of whistleblowing and its role in the fight against corruption, and to building the momentum that ultimately supported the adoption of the law.

The law was adopted following the 2024 election, which brought President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko to power. For many Senegalese observers, Ousmane Sonko is regarded as the country’s first emblematic whistleblower. In 2016, while serving as a senior tax inspector, he publicly exposed alleged financial mismanagement, controversial oil contracts, and abusive tax exemptions under Macky Sall’s administration. His public denunciations led to his dismissal from the civil service by presidential decree on 29 August 2016.²

Their administration marked a political rupture and ushered in a wave of institutional reforms, including a series of transparency-oriented laws, one of which was the whistleblower protection law. The National Assembly adopted three additional laws aimed at strengthening transparency: one on access to information, another establishing a body to combat fraud and corruption, and a third expanding wealth declaration requirements to magistrates and investigating judges.³

Following the adoption of law n°2025-14, the National Office for the Fight against Fraud and Corruption (OFNAC), the institution responsible for handling whistleblower disclosures, reported an increase in corruption reports. OFNAC reported approximately 100 complaints and denunciations received since the beginning of 2026, of which 36 resulted in the opening of investigations, although these cases were not exclusively based on whistleblower disclosures.⁴’⁵

Section 1: Whistleblowing Laws and Policies

As mentioned above, Senegal’s whistleblower protection framework is set out in Law n° 2025-14 on the statute and the protection of whistleblowers and its implementing decree n°2025-1834. The law establishes a dedicated statute for whistleblowers, defining who qualifies for protection, reportable conduct, reporting channels, and the safeguards afforded to those who come forward. Yet, its effectiveness in protecting whistleblowers may be undermined by several weaknesses. Additionally, the implementing decree provides limited guidance on the practical application of the law and does little to address these shortcomings.

This law is a key measure in Senegal’s fight against corruption. The country ranked 65th out of 186 countries assessed in Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, a score that signals a persistently high level of perceived corruption.⁶ Through Law n° 2025-14, Senegal has begun to give domestic effect to international commitments it had already made on paper: the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (ratified 2005), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (ratified 2007), and the ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption (2001), all of which require states parties to adopt legislative measures protecting those who report corruption.

Who is a whistleblower

The law defines a whistleblower (Art. 1) as a natural person who, in the course of their professional activities, reports, communicates, or discloses in good faith information relating to the commission or attempted commission of financial crimes or offences, threats or harm to the public interest, or violations affecting public or private financial management. This is the first statutory definition of a whistleblower in Senegalese law.

Article 2 further extends whistleblower status to three categories: natural or legal persons operating on a non-profit basis under private law who assist a whistleblower in formulating or disclosing a report; natural persons connected to a whistleblower who face risks of violence, threats, intimidation, or retaliation from employers, clients, or service recipients; and legal entities controlled by, or professionally linked to, a whistleblower.

This definition aligns with international standards: it is framed within the context of a professional relationship, and covers both the public and private sectors, natural and legal persons, and even those close to the whistleblower. It could, however, have been more precise had it required that whistleblowers possess direct or reasonably reliable knowledge of the facts reported, thereby filtering out disclosures based on mere rumour or suspicion.

The law also defines two mechanisms that do not, however, fall within the category of whistleblowing. Under article 3, the law allows a “front man” to be treated as a whistleblower; however, as framed in the law, the front man acts primarily to avoid prosecution or to gain legal advantages rather than to protect the public interest – as such, this does not amount to whistleblowing. Article 15 further recognises self-reporting as admissible, but only where no judicial investigation or inquiry has yet been opened and the individual has not already been questioned or summoned to testify on the relevant facts.

Types of reportable wrongdoing

Article 1 limits reportable conduct to three categories: the commission or attempted commission of a financial crime or offence; a threat or harm to the public interest; and a violation, or attempted concealment of a violation, affecting the management of public or private finances.

This scope is narrow by comparative standards. It is centred squarely on financial and economic wrongdoing and does not extend generically to other categories commonly covered elsewhere, such as health, safety, or environmental violations. This restricted material scope significantly weakens the law, since it excludes from protection individuals who disclose non-financial forms of wrongdoing.

Exemptions and limitations

The primary limitation lies in the good-faith requirement built into Article 1. International best practice discourages conditioning whistleblower status on good faith, since this shifts the inquiry toward the whistleblower’s motivations rather than the substance of the disclosure. The preferred standard is “reasonable belief,” which requires only that the whistleblower reasonably believed the allegations to be true, regardless of their underlying motive. Senegal’s reliance on a good-faith standard falls short of this benchmark and could expose whistleblowers to challenges based on their intentions rather than the accuracy or seriousness of their disclosures.

Furthermore, article 1 explicitly excludes several categories of information from the scope of permissible reporting: national defence secrecy, the secrecy of judicial deliberations, the secrecy of judicial investigations or inquiries, medical secrecy, attorney-client privilege, and any other secret protected under existing laws or regulations. Although some of these exclusions protect legitimate interests, the law establishes no specific alternative mechanism for reporting wrongdoing within the defence and security sector, leaving a gap for whistleblowers in that domain.

Reporting channels and procedures

Chapter II (Articles 4-8) sets out the reporting procedure. The law establishes both internal and external reporting channels as initial avenues for disclosure, allowing whistleblowers, in principle, to choose between them. In this regard, the law requires that the whistleblower must believe that the issue can be effectively remedied through the channel selected and that doing so will not expose them to retaliation. Finally, under certain conditions, it also permits public disclosure.

More specifically, under the internal channel (Arts. 4-6), a report is made, anonymously or not, to a designated referent within the entity concerned; public and private legal entities and state administrations must establish appropriate reporting procedures and designate an independent, confidential referent. However, the implementing decree does not establish specific guidelines for entities to follow when creating whistleblowing channels, creating a risk of fragmentation across entities. Without a common baseline, entities of varying size and sector may design procedures of uneven quality, meaning a whistleblower’s practical ability to report safely could depend more on which entity they belong to than on the protections the law intends to guarantee.

Moreover, the decree provides no sanctions for non-compliance, thereby weakening enforceability. In the absence of such a mechanism, the obligation to establish a channel risks becoming a purely formal requirement, with little incentive for entities to ensure their channels are genuinely functional and accessible – a shortcoming that risks undermining the law’s protective purpose.

Under the external channel (Art. 4), a whistleblower may report directly to the National Office of the Fight Against Fraud and Corruption (OFNAC), anonymously or not, by physical mail, electronic means, or telephone. OFNAC, established as Senegal’s primary anti-corruption body, is the sole external authority designated to receive and process reports from whistleblowers. Law n° 2025-12, adopted in August 2025, dissolved the former anti-corruption body and replaced it with a newly constituted body under the same name: it removed audit and fraud functions from its mandate, systematised open competitive appointment for all members, reversed the 2024 grant of custody powers to preserve separation of powers, and extended the prescription period for concealed offences to seven years from discovery. However, the implementing decree of Law No. 2025-14 does not specify requirements concerning its reporting procedures, including confidentiality, training of case managers and other key safeguards. Furthermore, it provides no guidance on the receipt or handling of oral reports, including the potentially sensitive information they may contain.

Finally, Article 8 imposes binding processing timelines: whistleblowers who use the internal reporting channel must be informed of the outcome within two months, while those who report to OFNAC, the external channel, must be informed within three months. Where these deadlines expire without action, Article 8(2) permits public disclosure, but only where there is a risk of evidence concealment or destruction, or serious grounds to believe that the relevant authority is in a conflict of interest or in collusion with the person implicated. It would have been useful to extend this possibility to situations involving an imminent or manifest threat to the public interest. The conditions governing public disclosure should also operate autonomously, rather than being systematically contingent upon the prior use or exhaustion of other reporting channels.

Protection measures and support mechanisms

Chapter III (Arts. 9 to 14) sets out the law’s protective architecture.

Article 9 prohibits retaliation, threats, intimidation, or attempts thereof against a whistleblower who has reported in accordance with the law’s procedures, and enumerates fifteen specific prohibited retaliatory measures, including suspension or dismissal, demotion, transfer or salary reduction, suspension of training, negative performance evaluations, disciplinary sanctions, coercion or harassment, discrimination, non-renewal of fixed-term contracts, reputational or financial harm, cancellation of contracts, revocation of licenses, and abusive referral to psychiatric or medical treatment. This protection extends to first-degree relatives and family members by marriage.

Article 10 grants civil and criminal immunity: whistleblowers are not civilly liable for damages caused by their report or public disclosure, and cannot be prosecuted, searched, arrested, detained, or tried in relation to the information reported. This immunity extends to cases where obtaining the information involved removing, diverting, or receiving documents containing it, provided this was done within the law’s conditions.

Article 11 protects the confidentiality of identity on both sides of a report: the whistleblower’s identifying information cannot be disclosed except to a judicial authority, and only with the whistleblower’s consent; the identifying information of the person implicated cannot be disclosed except to a judicial authority, and only once the merits of the report have been established.

Although the law provides for an extensive and diverse range of protections covering both personal and professional reprisals, and extends this protection to close relatives; yet it still contains several limitations. Notably, the law makes this protection conditional on the whistleblower having acted in accordance with the procedures set out in the law, it further does not consider applying any sanctions applicable to persons who engage in reprisals or even breach confidentiality requirements – a significant gap that leaves the prohibition without a clear deterrent or remedy attached to violations.

The law also fails to specify any remedy obligations for whistleblowers. Additionally, the law doesn’t place the burden of proof on the employer or accused authority.

These elements are not further specified in the implementing decree, which further undermines the effectiveness of these protection measures. However, it should be noted that OFNAC retains residual authority to take any other appropriate protective measure, with the support of competent national or international services (Art. 14), but no clear criteria are set out either in the law or the implementation decree.

Finally, the law allows whistleblowers to be rewarded when their disclosure leads to a conviction. In such cases, the whistleblower is entitled to a reward equal to 10% of the amount recovered, or an alternative amount determined by OFNAC. However, since payment is contingent on securing a conviction – a process that can take years – whistleblowers may face significant delays before receiving any reward.

Section 2: Relevant and Complementary Legislation

Law n° 2025-14 does not operate in a vacuum. Because it permits public disclosure as a reporting channel, the law directly implicates the media environment in which a whistleblower might choose to come forward. This makes the reality on the ground all the more consequential, and in Senegal’s case, that reality has been deteriorating. Senegal ranked 49th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2021 World Press Freedom Index; by 2022 it had fallen to 73rd, a drop of 24 places in a single year, and in 2026 it stood at 78th.⁷

Freedom of Expression and Related Freedoms

Constitutional and Legal Protections

Article 8 of the 2001 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, opinion, and the press. The main statutory framework is Law n° 2017-27, the Code de la Presse, which sets out journalists’ rights and duties. The Code defines a number of freedoms that are important for an environment conducive to whistleblowing, but it also carries weaknesses that could be turned against whistleblowers and the journalists who work with them.

Article 5 guarantees journalists free access to information sources and the right to investigate matters of public interest, subject to national defence secrecy, judicial-investigation secrecy, and site-access regulations.

Article 16 requires journalists to protect their sources, “except in cases of manipulation,” which is directly relevant given that Law n° 2025-14 permits whistleblowers to disclose to the media as a last resort. This protection is weaker than it looks: no criminal or administrative penalty attaches to a breach of the source-confidentiality duty, so a journalist who reveals a source faces no legal consequence beyond professional or self-regulatory sanction, and the undefined “manipulation” exception creates further uncertainty about when the duty lapses.

The Code does provide some safety measures. Article 196 criminalises obstruction of press freedom, punishable by a fine of 500,000 to 3,000,000 CFA francs, doubled on repeat offence, and Article 197 extends the Penal Code’s provisions on violence and destruction to attacks on journalists or their equipment. The Code, however, doesn’t address intimidation, harassment, or administrative pressure.

Media Freedom

In practice, Senegal’s media landscape, historically considered one of the freer in the region, has deteriorated markedly over the past several years, and this deterioration has real consequences for whistleblowers who might otherwise rely on the press as a disclosure channel. This decline tracks a series of concrete incidents. During the June 2021 protests following Ousmane Sonko’s arrest, the broadcast regulator (the National Audiovisual Regulatory Council, CNRA) suspended the signals of two private television channels, SenTV and WalfTV, for 72 hours, citing “irresponsible coverage” and “flagrant regulatory violations.” RSF also documented attacks by unidentified individuals on the premises of private radio station RFM and the newspapers L’Observateur and Le Soleil during the same unrest.⁸

The most emblematic case is that of journalist Pape Alé Niang, director of the online outlet Dakar Matin. He was arrested three times over social media posts regarding then opposition leader Ousmane Sonko and charged with disclosing information harmful to national defence, receiving confidential military documents, and spreading false news.⁹ His case drew sustained international attention: 78 African journalists and press freedom organisations signed an RSF-coordinated appeal for his release, and the case became a symbol of the gap between Senegal’s constitutional press freedom guarantees and their application in politically sensitive moments.¹⁰

2023 also saw a record number of journalist detentions in a single year, the highest recorded since the Committee to Protect Journalists began keeping records in 1992, including the arrest of six staff members of the online outlet Allô Sénégal in Thiès in November 2023 on defamation and impersonation charges following a complaint by a government minister.¹¹ The Committee to Protect Journalists subsequently published security guidelines for Senegalese journalists in response to the deteriorating environment.¹²

Taken together, a whistleblower weighing whether to approach a journalist is doing so against the backdrop of a press environment in which journalists themselves face real legal and physical risks for reporting that would carry the whistleblower’s information to the public.

Access to Information Law

Senegal’s access-to-information framework is set out in Law n° 2025-15, adopted in 2025 along with the whistleblower protection law. It establishes a general right of access to information held by public and quasi-public bodies, filling a gap previously addressed only indirectly through sectoral texts such as the personal data law and the Code de la Presse. For whistleblower advocacy purposes, it is a useful complementary tool: it gives potential whistleblowers and supporting journalists a formal mechanism to gather public records that might substantiate a report.

The law applies to the presidency, the National Assembly, the government, the Constitutional Council, the Cour des Comptes, courts, any other constitutionally established institution, all public agents at any level, territorial entities, and private entities receiving public funding or carrying out a public-service mission. This breadth gives whistleblowers and journalists a wide field of bodies from which to request documentation.

However, three features limit the law’s usefulness for whistleblowers specifically. First, the law access to information national protected secrets, information that could harm foreign relations or public safety, and information governed by other special regimes, are broad, undefined, and carry no public-interest override, so they could be invoked to withhold exactly the kind of information that would otherwise support accountability are excluded from the right to access information (Art.2). Second, requests must disclose the requester’s identity (Art. 14), with no anonymous or confidential channel, meaning a whistleblower gathering corroborating evidence risks being identified by the entity implicated in their prospective disclosure. Third, response timelines are workable but not immediate: requests should in principle receive an immediate response (Art. 17), with a maximum window of 15 days where retrieval requires prior processing (Arts. 18 to 19), and silence at the deadline counts as an implicit rejection (Art. 20). Access is free in principle, capped at reproduction cost (Art. 22). Wrongful refusal is punishable by a fine of 500,000 to 10,000,000 CFA francs (Art. 30), which gives the right real teeth, though the same article symmetrically penalizes an official who knowingly discloses exempted information, meaning an official who helps a whistleblower by sharing otherwise-exempt records risks the same sanction as one who wrongfully withholds them.

Data Protection and Cybercrime Laws

Senegal’s 2008 personal data protection law requires that personal data be treated confidentially and protected against alteration, damage, or unauthorised access (Arts. 38 and 71). This supports the confidentiality of a whistleblower’s identity in practice, since it regulates the processing of information about both the whistleblower and the subject of an allegation, which matters because whistleblowing files often contain sensitive personal and criminal-conduct data. Articles 35 (data minimisation and retention) and 40 to 42 (restrictions on sensitive and criminal-offence data) impose substantive limits on what organisations can collect and process. The law also establishes the Personal Data Commission (CDP) as external oversight, which makes practical implementation more likely, and together these provisions create a regulatory framework supportive of secure whistleblowing channels.

Law n°2008-11 on cybercrime imposes criminal penalties on unauthorised disclosure of personal information obtained in the course of recording, classifying, or processing it, where the disclosure could harm the person’s reputation or private life (Art. 431-30): one to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 10 million CFA francs (USD 882 to 17 635) for intentional disclosure, six months to five years and a fine of 300,000 to 5 million CFA francs (USD 529 to 8 817) for negligent disclosure. This is a potential hindrance for whistleblowing, since it could in principle expose a whistleblower who discloses personal information about a wrongdoer to criminal liability. Article 431-56 separately criminalises obtaining personal, confidential, or professionally privileged information through fraudulent means, including false identities, which is worth flagging as a further potential gap for whistleblowers who might need to gather evidence covertly.

B. Anti-Corruption Legislation

Although Senegal has built up an anti-corruption arsenal over the years, corruption has been endemic, and it’s only in 2024 that it was removed from the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) grey list for money laundering.¹³

Law n° 2012-22, Code of Transparency in Public Finance Management, adopted in 2012, transposing WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) Directive n° 1/2009/CM/UEMOA, sets transparency principles for public finance management: clarity of the legal framework, oversight by deliberative bodies, control of budget execution, procurement transparency, and regular public disclosure, including an annual budget guide and a post-election report on the state of public finances audited by the Cour des Comptes.

Law n° 2018-03, Combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism imposes due-diligence obligations on financial institutions and other regulated entities (Arts. 5 to 6) and, most relevant here, requires them to file suspicion reports with the National Financial Intelligence Unit (CENTIF) whenever funds or transactions may be linked to money laundering or terrorist financing, with employees required to inform management immediately upon becoming aware of such operations.

Law n° 81-53, Repression of Illicit Enrichment (1981) created the offence of illicit enrichment, defined as the inability of a person exercising a public function to justify, upon formal notice, the licit origin of assets or a lifestyle disproportionate to their legal income. In 2023, the National Assembly adopted Law n° 2023-14 (2 August 2023), creating the judicial financial pole (PJF), a specialised structure within the financial prosecutor’s office and investigating judges, which now handles the full range of economic and financial offences.

C. Criminal Law and Procedure.

Article 362 of the Penal Code criminalises false accusations. For whistleblowers, Article 362 represents a significant potential deterrent. It criminalises false denunciation with a penalty of six months to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 francs (approximately USD 90 to USD 890) – a serious consequence that could discourage individuals from coming forward, particularly given the inherent uncertainty in many corruption or wrongdoing allegations at the time they are reported. The provision is especially concerning in that it does not require proof of malicious intent for a denunciation to be deemed “calumnious”: as the text makes clear, prosecution can proceed even where an acquittal or dismissal was granted only on the basis of reasonable doubt, rather than a definitive finding that the reported facts did not occur.

In practice, this means a whistleblower who reports in good faith but whose allegations are ultimately not proven to the required legal standard could still face criminal liability under this article. This creates a considerable chilling effect, as the risk of prosecution may weigh more heavily on a potential whistleblower’s decision to report than the protections nominally afforded to them elsewhere in the law.

Section 3: PPLAAF’s Engagement in Senegal

Since 2020, PPLAAF has been working in Senegal to strengthen whistleblower protection and promote transparency. Over the years, PPLAAF has organised conferences, workshops and training sessions, as well as digital awareness campaigns, reaching journalists, civil society organisations, activists, trade unionists and citizens more broadly. These activities have contributed to raising awareness of whistleblowing as an important tool for accountability and good governance.

More recently, PPLAAF’s work in Senegal has been strengthened through a partnership agreement with the National Office against Fraud and Corruption (OFNAC). Through this partnership, PPLAAF contributes to activities aimed at raising awareness of the new whistleblower protection law, including its dissemination and promotion among relevant stakeholders. PPLAAF also brings its legal and technical expertise to these efforts and continues to develop its own activities in support of whistleblowers.

Through this combination of legal support, technical expertise and awareness-raising, PPLAAF aims to contribute to the effective implementation of the new law and to creating a safer environment for people who report corruption and other abuses in Senegal.

Section 4: Resource, Knowledge, and Advice Centres

ARTICLE 19

ARTICLE 19 is an international human rights organisation working to defend and promote freedom of expression and access to information. In Senegal and across West Africa, the organisation works with civil society, journalists and other stakeholders on issues including freedom of the press, access to information, digital rights and the protection of civic space. ARTICLE 19 is a relevant partner on issues related to whistleblower protection, particularly given the close links between freedom of expression, access to information and the ability of individuals and journalists to report wrongdoing safely.

Address: Mamelles Aviation, G 60, BP 5175, Dakar, Sénégal.

Telephone: +221 33 869 03 22

Email: westafrica@article19.org

Website: https://www.article19.org/fr/region/senegal-fr/

Afrikajom Center

Afrikajom Center is a Senegalese civil society organisation founded by Alioune Tine that works on human rights, democracy, governance and peacebuilding in Senegal and across Africa. The organisation engages with civil society organisations, public institutions and other stakeholders on issues related to democratic governance, human rights and the protection of civic space. Its work and networks make it a relevant stakeholder for discussions around transparency, accountability and the protection of people who speak out against corruption and abuses.

Address: Mamelles, Dakar Cité CSPI BP 24977 Dakar, Sénégal

Telephone: +221 33 825 84 40

Email: contact@afrikajomcenter.net

Website: https://afrikajomcenter.net/nous-contacter/