In 2017, the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa (“PPLAAF“) was approached by whistleblowers who participated in the negotiations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC“) and the global port operator Dubai Ports World (“DPW“) regarding the construction in the city of Banana of DRC’s largest deep-water port to date. Having doubts about the contract’s legality, at least one of the whistleblowers notified his superiors who did not act. Concerned about their inaction and the lack of other alternatives, they connected with PPLAAF to aid them in revealing how the negotiations took place.
At their request, their anonymity is preserved. The facts, explanations, and documents as presented by PPLAAF were given by the whistleblowers themselves. PPLAAF did not alter their testimony.
The contract to be signed by the DRC government and DPW for the construction and operation of the Banana port is expected to create a corporate structure, allowing the personal enrichment of several political figures, including Congolese President Kabila. The whole of the negotiations, on a project exceeding one billion US dollars, would be tainted with corruption.
Epstein Files raise new concerns about DP World’s activities in Africa
2026 Update
Documents recently released by the U.S. Department of Justice shed further light on the behind-the-scenes dealings surrounding the Banana Port construction project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Emails from Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, then CEO of Dubai Ports World (DP World), show a direct interest in involving Jeffrey Epstein in the Banana Port development project in the DRC. The records indicate that Epstein participated in discussions concerning the project’s direction.
As early as 2017, PPLAAF’s investigation of the Banana Port Papers exposed serious irregularities in the negotiations surrounding the Banana deep-water port project in the DRC. The dealings between the Congolese government and the global port operator DP World raised substantial legal and governance concerns. In 2024, however, British International Investment (BII) committed up to USD 35 million to support the development of the DRC’s first deep-water container port. BII is the UK government’s development finance institution, overseen by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The investment was made alongside DP World. According to a 2025 investigation by PPLAAF and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), the port is located within the protected areas of the Mangroves Marine Park in the DRC, further confirming findings from the Banana Port Papers investigation.
The correspondence, spanning several years, documents Epstein’s knowledge of Bin Sulayem’s African business activities and points to connections between prominent figures and major commercial projects on the continent.
At the centre of the correspondence was the DRC – and more specifically, former President Joseph Kabila and a port project that appeared to be gathering momentum. Bin Sulayem recounted proposing to Kabila that a financier would accompany him on his next visit. “I met president Kabila I discussed port investment which he welcomes he want to give us investment in mining and oil and gas I mentioned to him that I have an American fund manager who will visit with me next time he welcomed that very much”, Bin Sulayem wrote in an email sent to Epstein on 23 May 2013.
In the same email, Bin Sulayem set out an ambitious travel schedule to Epstein, sketching a sweep across Africa. He spoke of recent visits with top officials and head of states and future journeys through the DRC, Gabon and Rwanda, and flagged an upcoming circuit that would take him to South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique. Bin Sulayem further adds that “I will then discuss with you the outcome and we will visit together at a convenient date to you” suggesting a degree of personal involvement and ongoing coordination between the two parties.
Two months later, on 28 and 29 July 2013, Bin Sulayem extended the invitation again. He offered Epstein the opportunity to join him in meetings later that year with a roster of African heads of state: President Kabila of the DRC, President Ali Bongo of Gabon, President Macky Sall of Senegal, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya: “By the way do you still want me to arrange […] meetings with Kabila of Congo, Bongo of Gabon, Maky sal [Macky Sall] of Senegal and kagima [Kagame] of Rawanda [Rwanda] and uhuru of Kenya if I start from now we can firm up dates starting mid sept or and are convenient to you“. The outreach suggested a coordinated effort to engage at the highest political levels. There is, however, no recorded response from Epstein to that proposal.
In March 2018, Bin Sulayem communicates to Epstein that he is unable to visit him in New York, as“the President of Congo has insisted on signing the port concession agreement with [him] in person on Friday” referring to the Banana port, showing that years after the initial exchange, he remains fully informed of and closely attuned to the ongoing development. Pamina Avocats, the law firm that advised DP World on the Banana Port concession, confirms on its website that the contract was indeed signed in March 2018.
Further evidence of Epstein’s reach as an active and informed broker operating at the intersection of African infrastructure development and global business interests emerges through his correspondence with Olivier Colom, a former diplomatic advisor at the Élysée Palace under Nicolas Sarkozy. In their exchange, Colom asked Epstein whether Bin Sulayem would be interested in acquiring the French logistics company NECOTRANS, which operates significant port operations across Africa. Epstein’s response was characteristically brief: “I’ll ask,” followed shortly after by a simple “yes”.
This exchange takes on greater significance in light of PPLAAF’s findings from the Banana Port Papers investigation, which revealed that DP World and NECOTRANS jointly wrote to the Organisation d’Équipement Banana Kinshasa (OEBK), the Congolese public authority in charge of developing the Banana-Kinshasa corridor on 23 March 2016, expressing formal interest in developing the Banana floating dock project in the DRC. Although the DRC government proceeded to enter direct negotiations with DP World alone, sidelining NECOTRANS.
These revelations add to a growing body of evidence pointing to the opacity surrounding the development of the Banana Port project and to the deeply problematic nature of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem’s approach to international business development. Further documentation suggests that Epstein helped to arrange a meeting in 2009 between Bin Sulayem and Peter Mandelson – a UK politician arrested in February 2026 on suspicion of misconduct in public office in connection with the Epstein scandal, subsequently released on bail pending further investigation – in connection with a separate DP World project: the London Gateway port development.
While Bin Sulayem stepped down from his role in 2026 due to his ties to Jeffrey Epstein, it is important to note that he personally oversaw and managed these projects throughout their development. His departure does not diminish his direct responsibility for the conduct and relationships that defined DP World’s expansion during his tenure.
Contacted by PPLAAF, DP World, Bin Sulayem and Kabila’s lawyer didn’t reply to our requests for comment.
Banana Port Papers Investigation
2017
The negotiations
The construction of a deep-water port in Banana, the only part of the Congolese territory with direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, has been in the plans for years.

In 2015, the DRC government began looking for an operator for a construction project for a floating dock at the coastal town of Banana. Several companies were approached, including the French company NECOTRANS.
On March 23rd, 2016, Jean-Phillipe Gouyet, CEO of NECOTRANS, and Suhail Al Banna, CEO of DPW Africa and the Middle East’s department, sent a letter to the Organisation d’Equipement Banana Kinshasa (“OEBK“), a Congolese public authority in charge of developing the Banana-Kinshasa corridor. The letter expresses the interest of the DP World / NECOTRANS consortium for building the Banana floating dock project.
Following this letter, the DRC government entered direct negotiations with DPW, without NECOTRANS, for the construction of the floating dock. Since no call for tenders had been issued, as it is required by Congolese law, the authority in charge of public markets issued a special permission for the OEBK to negotiate with DPW without calling for tenders.
Following the beginning of the negotiations, the parties agreed on a bigger project: the construction of a real deep-water port. A new authoriztion to override the call for tenders has not, at PPLAAF’s knowledge, been issued for the deep-sea port project.
Moise Ekanga, executive secretary of the Sino-Congolese Program Monitoring Office, and a close associate of President Kabila, was reportedly involved in the negotiations from the beginning. Ekanga reportedly requested direct talks with Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, CEO of DPW, to secure President Kabila’s personal interests.
Eventually, it was Congolese businessman Claude Makoso who went to Dubai on March 27th, 2016 to meet the CEO of DPW.
In the summer of 2016, DPW representatives traveled twice to the DRC to negotiate the contract between the parties. DPW’s delegations included Jamal Majid Bin Thaniah, DPW’s vice-president and Group CEO of Dubai world, Dubai’s investment company whose assets include DPW, and Tarik El Farouki, DPW Director of Development in Africa.
Following the first negotiations, President Kabila reportedly told Ekanga that he wanted a guarantee that he would have a personal profit from the construction and operation of the port.
On October 4th, 2016, in this context, Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem addressed a letter to President Kabila. This letter was sent to Ekanga, who reportedly brought it to the president. This letter ensures the intention to grant a percentage of the capital of the company that will build the port to a new Congolese state company.
«We are willing to offer a minority equity stake in the port operating company to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo with the management of the port being undertaken by a subsidiary owned by DP World. »
This letter was accompanied by an appendix which presents the different hypotheses for involving a private company in the case, presumably at the discretion of President Kabila:


Hypothesis A would propose to involve private shareholders in the concessionary company (“Privé”), which would de facto be a company benefiting to Kabila’s inner circle. According to the whistleblowers, this option was not the preference of DPW because it could have raised doubts about corruption.
Hypothesis B proposes to give 40% of the managing company (“Gestionnaire”) to this private company. The “Privé RDC” may be a company ultimately owned by President Kabila.
According to PPLAAF’s sources, hypothesis B to hold a private company up to 40% in the managing company has been retained.
The first memorandum of understanding was signed on January 3rd, 2017, by José Makila, DRC’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport, on the bases presented above . Then, on February 9th, 2017, the memorandum of understanding is officially signed by José Makila and Suhail Al Banna.
Following the signature, DPW opened a subsidiary in the DRC, headed by Claude Makoso. Makoso is expected to be the director of the company responsible for the construction of the port.
On February 15th, 2017, Al Banna sent a letter to Makila to thank him and send a detailed work plan for a period of six months.
The Parisian law firm Carbonnier Lamaze Rasle & Associés is alleged to have worked with DPW on the drafting of the contract.
During the month of June, the parties met in the DRC to finalize the contract. The last round of negotiations likely took place between June 31st and July 4th, 2017. The DPW delegation was made up of DPW’s head of legal department Olivier Schwartz and El Farouki. The delegation mainly negotiated with Ekanga.
Al Banna sent another letter to Makila on July 17th, 2017, to report on the progress of negotiations and feasibility studies, as well as to request an extension of the two-month exclusivity period, and thus to delay the signing of the contract, scheduled for August 9th.
On October 5th, 2017, Makila traveled to Dubai to visit DPW’s premises in light of the imminent signature.
As described in Al Banna’s letter, the parties postponed the signing date by a few months. The new date would have been October 28th, 2017. This date was also delayed as the minister of finance, Wivine Mumba Matipa, has reportedly refused to countersign.
The DPW delegation arrived in October and included Anil Wats, Chief Operating Officer of DPW, and El Farouki. President Kabila reportedly received them on October 28th at 10 am to announce the delay in signing, and to assure them that the contract would be signed later. This decision to postpone the signature was taken at the last minute as invitations to attend the signing had already been sent to officials
The Project
The project concerns the construction and management of a port and free trade area in Banana at a cost of more than 1 billion US dollars. The first planned phase is the construction of a 1,500-meter wharf on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. The DRC has an entrance to the ocean to the Congo River. The cost of this first phase is approximately 396 million US dollars (see p.98 of the Feasibility Study).

DPW would have liked to start the construction in the blue square. But President Kabila would have insisted on starting in phase 1, red square, and then progressing to phase 2, yellow square.
The construction of the port would be accomplished by a Chinese company, Guang Ping International. Guang Ping is alleged to have already signed a logistics contract with Alain Wan’s company, MW Afritec, to use the latter’s private port located on his quarry near Boma for construction. Alain Wan, a Belgian-Congolese businessman, has already been pinpointed by PPLAAF, Le Monde, and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) as one of the instigators of a vast fraudulent system combining several front companies to spend public money for the private interests of Ferme Espoir, a company owned by President Kabila.
The feasibility studies and the environmental study have been approved by the parties.
The Concessionary Company
The public will know that a joint venture, called during the negotiations “Port Autonome de Banana”, will be created by a Congolese state company and DPW. This joint venture should then enter into a concession agreement with the DRC government. The state company in the joint venture should have logically been one of the Congolese public authorities in charge of the ports (the National Transport Office of the Democratic Republic of Congo or the OEBK), but they have been reportedly put aside in favor of this new state entity.
It is the joint venture “Port Autonome de Banana” that should own the concession. It would be a limited company, under Congolese law, owned 30% by the State of DRC or the new state entity to be created, and 70% by DPW. The parties would have initially negotiated a split of 25% for the DRC and 75% for DPW, but it is a 70/30 split that would have been accepted.
The structure of this company was established in the memorandum of understanding, p.5:
“In any event, DP World will retain the majority of the Company’s capital and operational control, however, and throughout the duration of the Concession, the DRC’s shareholding level cannot be diluted in relation to the Port project.”
And:
“The DRC has the right to acquire shares or minority shares in the Company. This can be achieved through in-kind contributions to the company through a public body that will represent the DRC as a shareholder for the duration of the Concession. “
The state-owned company within the concessionary company
The state-owned company in the joint venture is expected to be 51% owned by the Congolese state. DPW would not sign the contract, according to the whistleblowers, if this state company is not at least 51% owned by the Congolese state.
According to the whistleblowers, the remaining 49% will belong to a nominee of President Kabila or to a Congolese private company in which Kabila has shares directly or indirectly.
The president could, therefore, earn profits not only on the 40% of the managing company but also on the 49% of this state company. Given that the identity of the company holding the 51% is not yet known, it is possible that President Kabila also benefits from it by creating a new state company.
The contribution of the DRC, as agreed in the aforementioned memorandum of understanding, may be “in kind”, that is to say by the granting of land and tax exemptions. Simply put, in exchange for land owned by the Congolese state, President Kabila, thanks to the 49% of the Congolese company owning 30% of the joint venture, could draw from this contract a large profit.
The Managing Company
The managing company would, therefore, be a “subsidiary of DPW”, owned 40% by a private company, presumably for President Kabila’s benefit.
Of the 100% of revenues that will be generated during the operation, the managing company would receive 15% gross. This 15% will then be divided between DPW (60%) and the private company that would be partially owned by President Kabila. This private company will be created by the presidential adviser to the Republic and current director of the Insurance Regulatory Authority Alain Kaninda, and owned by President Kabila and the Sultan. (See annex hypotheses).
According to the document presenting the assumptions to President Kabila, such an arrangement would allow the “privé DRC” to earn more than 45.3 million dollars in seven years.
DRC’s contribution
The DRC does not contribute financially to the project. In addition to administrative facilities and tax exemptions, the DRC’s contribution of 30% mainly consists of land grants.
See the Memorandum of Understanding, p.2:
“The DRC will make available the land necessary for the development of the Port; free of any social, environmental or financial constraint. “
The DRC would, therefore, intend to expropriate all the entities to which the land belongs for the development of the port:
- the OEBK, in accordance with the ordinance of March 28th, 1972, n ° 072-184 creating the OEBK and which allot to it the lands of the project,
- The Army,
- The Ministry of the Environment, the peninsula being perceived as a tourist area,
- The National Office of Transport, which owns a 75 meter quay,
- Several private persons.
Oil company Perenco and a Chinese fishing company are also present on the ground.
The Length of the Concession
DPW would have asked for 50 years of concession. While the standard is to base the duration of the concession on an economic study, DPW would have asked for this duration without proving it based on similar projects in the market.
Possible Infractions of Congolese Law
This case includes some potential violations of Congolese law. In the first place, there was no call for tenders under the Code of Public Procurement (see Articles 17, 41 and 42 of the Code of Public Procurement). Secondly, the alleged remunerations of public officials are punishable under the Corruption Act (Articles 147-150).
Officials with more information about this issue are encouraged to contact PPLAAF.



